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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 22/05/2004

Accident number: 406

Accident time: 05:55

Accident Date: 23/11/02

Where it occurred: Task No.116,
Kamchewai, Northern
Red Sea Zone

Country: Eritrea

Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: AM HT

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 07/12/2002
Name of source: MACC Eritrea

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: AT (unrecorded)

Ground condition: dry/dusty
grass/grazing area

Date record created: 01/04/04

Date last modified: 22/05/04

No of victims: 8

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude: 38° 38' 52" E

Latitude: 16° 28' 04" N

Alt. coord. system: UTM

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east: 37462402

Map north: 1820876

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
dog missed mine (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
inadequate training (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate communications (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
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Accident report
An accident report was apparently compiled jointly by the demining group involved and the
Country MACC. Documents provided had only the demining group logo on them, so it was
first assumed that the investigation was effectively “internal” and witnessed by MACC
personnel. It later became clear that the following report was not written with the collaboration
of the Country MACC, although it is worded to sound as if it were. See Other documents and
Related papers for the MAC's report on the accident and its investigation. Other papers made
available are also reproduced under Related papers at the Other documents tab.
The political situation between MACC and government was unfortunate, and the MACC did
not have the desired level of authority over demining groups working in the country. The
internal report that follows is not comprehensive, concentrating on how the mine was missed
rather than the fatal problems of casualty evacuation that ensued.
The following papers have been edited for anonymity.

Minefield history (from IMSMA report)
“The mines were laid by EPLF in 1978 in order to protect their defensive position from
Ethiopian tank penetration. Although EPLF combat engineers cleared the area, anti-tank
mines such as the TMN-46 and PRB-M3 (also PRB-3) are still visible in the area. Although
people use the area for grazing, still no accident happen.
The land will be used for agriculture as well as for grazing.”
[One civilian accident had happened within metres of this incident, as shown by a frag on the
maps and is referenced in one of the IMSMA reports as “In January 2003 there was mine
accident on a child.”]

Physical description (from IMSMA report)
“The danger area is flat surrounded by mountains. There are few trees and vegetation on the
area. It has sand type of soil. There is a big seasonal river near the danger area. The ground
is flat at the bottom of a big mountain. It is suitable for all types of demining.”
“Cultivated area had been ploughed by hand not by machine (only 1 year). When the locals
found mines they stopped.”
An Eritrean Mine Action Programme tasking order stated that “manual clearance depth
(where required) is 20cm.”

FATAL INCIDENT REPORT, DEMINING INCIDENT AT KAMCHEWAY 23 NOVEMBER
2002 - AN ANTI TANK (AT) MINE MISSED BY THE MINE DETECTION DOG (MDD) TEAM
The [Demining group] Demining Incident, 23 November 2002
Demining Incident Preliminary Investigation Report for Submission to the Director of
the [Demining group] and the Eritrean Demining Authority

Executive Summary
The incident occurred after the rear right wheel of the [Demining group] Land Rover 110
travelled over the top of an anti-tank mine, possibly a Belgian PRB-M3 minimum metal antitank mine buried at depth of less than 10cm, causing it to detonate. The mine had been
missed by two mine detection dogs who had previously searched the lane in both directions.
Clearance had been conducted as per [Demining group] manual and mine detection dog
standard operating procedures. The marking and mapping of the minefield had been correct
and although, the administration / parking area had been re-located within an area where
there had been anti-tank mines laid in a identified pattern, the area had been cleared and
therefore, there was no reason for the Team Leader to suspect the presence of further mines.
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A contributing factor to the mine incident was confidence in the mine detection dogs in their
ability to find anti-tank mines after they had already located six mines in Kumchewai. This led
[Demining group] to believe that the dogs would not miss mines. In addition to this, manual
quality assurance had been conducted on ground cleared by dogs, an area was excavated in
the vicinity of the PRB-M3 which had been removed during the survey and manual clearance
had been carried out between the dog lanes in Area 2. No further mines were located by the
manual deminers in these areas and therefore, there was no reason to believe that any
additional mines were there.
Although, mine detection dogs proved that they could locate mines in Kumchewai, this
incident has highlighted the fact that dogs do miss mines and therefore, the only way to avoid
a mine accident in a dog cleared area is to conduct full clearance of the dog cleared area.
This would therefore, seem to defeat the purpose of using dogs to locate mines as it would
mean that the area would have to be cleared with another asset prior to the handler walking
forward. Although, the dogs could be used for area reduction, for example, deployed from a
road or tench-Iine [sic] into a suspect area in order to establish the mine pattern, with the
current methods of deploying dogs, this would inevitably mean that the handler would have to
walk forward into a dog cleared area.
Although, there were regular site visits and numerous planning meetings, there is a possibility
that, had their been more permanent supervision at the task that certain aspects of the
planning process may have been reviewed. The fluency of the dog clearance and climate
restraints on deploying the dogs meant that quite often when the site was visited by senior
[Demining group] staff, the dogs were not working or they had completed a particular area
and the markings had been removed. Although, there was complete understanding of the
clearance plan and process, there is a possibility that if an expatriate or experienced senior
national staff member was at the site for lengthy periods of time, bearing in mind that there
had been mixed assets deployed (manual and dogs) that a decision may have been taken to
manually clear the dog cleared areas, particularly in Area 2 or even conduct additional
manual excavation.
Summary, Conclusions, Further Actions and Recommendations
Introduction
The following summary, conclusions, further actions and recommendations have been
compiled based on the evidence gathered during the [Demining group] Initial Investigation
and Follow-up Investigations carried out for the demining incident at the [Demining group]
mine clearance Task116 in Kumchewai, northern Eritrea on 23 November 2002.
1.
Summary
On 23 December 2002 at 05:50, a [Demining group] Land Rover. 110 ambulance transporting
eight [Demining group] personnel, initiated an anti-tank mine with its rear right wheel In
Kumchewai minefield Task number 116. This resulted in the death of four [Demining group]
personnel and injuries to two others. The vehicle had driven into an area previously cleared
by manual deminers using Ebinger GC detectors and by mine detection dogs (MDD). An
administration / parking area had been established on 11 November 2002 by the Debub
Demining Supervisor and the manual team had been parking the Land Rover 110 there since.
The administration / parking area fell within a cleared and subsequently identified AT laid
mine line.
In the immediate area of the incident, three TM-46 and one PRB-M3 anti-tank mine had been
removed during a [Demining group] survey, one mine had been located by the MDD during
clearance and an AT incident had reportedly occurred in December 2001. An additional TM46 had been recovered during the survey at 50 metres to the west of the others and all five
mines removed during the survey had been found partially buried with the pressure plates
visible. The TM-46 located by the MDDs in Area 1 was at a depth of less than 10 cm and
the12 subsequent TM-46 mines cleared by manual deminers in the same area were at a
depth of less than 10 cm. All these mines are believed to form part of the same mine line
linking up to mines located with the Large Loop Detectors in Area 3.
Prior to working in Kumchewai, the mine detection dogs had been used on a number of tasks
for verification after manual clearance had been conducted, verification of suspect areas
where there was no evidence of mines being laid and for quality assurance of areas cleared
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by mechanical assets. This was therefore, the first time that the dogs had been used to locate
mines in a confirmed mined area. There are numerous contributing factors to consider when
deploying mine detection dogs such as soil moisture content and the temperature.
Clearance Plan and Process: Prior to commencing mine clearance in Kumchewai
discussions and site visits by senior [Demining group] staff had taken place. Prior to the mine
incident there had been a number of detector evaluations performed in order to assess the
performance of in-country [Demining group] detectors and confirm the maximum depth mines
could be located in various soil conditions. During the clearance process there had been
regular site visits by senior [Demining group] staff and further discussions regarding the
current and future clearance plans. Based on previous detector evaluations, evidence found
during the survey and subsequence clearance by the MDD and manual teams, [Demining
group] concluded that the anti-tank mines buried in Kumchewai were at a depth of less than
10 cm and within the range of the Ebinger GC detector. The mine detection dogs had cleared
325 metres towards the known mined area (Area 2), located a TM-46 on the fourth day of
clearance (22 April 2002) and subsequently located four more TM-46 in the same area (Area
1). This increased the confidence of the dog handler and the team in the dogs ability to

find mines. Although, the dog handler had reported that a mine had been located by
the dogs at a depth of 28cm, this had been destroyed in situation without visual
confirmation from a senior member of [Demining group] staff, the information on the depth
had only been received by the Operations Cell in Asmara at a later date and no member of
the MDD team could subsequently confirm the depth. In Area 2, it was decided to manually
excavate an area around the PRB-M3 which had been located during the survey. This
process was continued until enough evidence had been gathered (mines located on survey &
further mines located) that the process was stopped.
The clearance plan prior to the mine incident in Kumchewai were based on the following:
(1) The belief that the mine detection dogs could locate anti-tank mines in Kumchewai
minefield.
(2) Anti-tank mines laid in Kumchewai were at a depth of less than 10 cm. The report of a
mine located by the MDDs at a depth of 28 cm was unconfirmed and all other mines located
by the MDDs and manual deminers had all been at depths of less than 10 cm.
(3) A possibility that further PRB-M3 mines were laid in Kumchewai minefield.
(4) The detectors deployed were capable of locating PRB-M3 mines to a depth of 10 cm
(based on previous tests performed).
(5) The detectors deployed were capable of locating TM-46 mines to a depth of 50+ cm.
(6) At least two mine lines were laid within the area cleared. One line of TM-46 in Area 1 had
been located. In Area 2 and a line of TM-46 and one PRB-M3 had been located which may
have been part of the line of TM-46 located in Area 3.
(7) The areas between the MDD lanes in Area 2 had been cleared by manual deminers and
no further mines had been located. A 10% manual quality assurance had been conducted in
MDD cleared areas which resulted in no mines being located. This information fuelled further
confidence in the dogs ability to clear mines.
Communications
In Eritrea, the [Demining group] uses Codan HP (vehicle mounted and base station) radios.
This ensures communication between the headquarters, the remote locations, the remote
camps and teams. Radio checks are performed prior, during and at the end of each working
day in the minefield and all vehicle movements are coordinated through the radio operators.
Each demining team is backed up by at least 1 Land Rover ambulance which is fitted with a
HF Codan radio. No mine clearance task will take place without communications. In addition
the Team Leader, section commanders and ambulance driver is equipped with a VHF radio
which enables them to communicate with each other and other sites depending on the range.
In Kumchewai, the team was equipped with 1 Codan vehicle mounted radio, and two VHF
radios (Team Leader and ambulance).
Vehicles
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Each mine clearance team is supported by a Land Rover ambulance and a DAF or Bedford
truck. In Kumchewai the team consisted of 1 Team Leader, 1 section commander and 7
deminers. The DAF truck was often required for administration duties during the working day,
for example, to collect fuel and water, therefore, once the team had deployed to the minefield
the truck would depart Kumchewai and return at the end of the working day. In order to
operate effectively and work within the Eritrean Labour Law, non-essential vehicle
movements are restricted to normal working hours.
Medical support
In Kumchewai there were two dedicated medic/deminers with the section. One of the medics
had been in the Land Rover when it struck the mine and died. Although, that left only one
dedicated medic, all other personnel had received some medical training during there time
with [Demining group] and were able to assist. The casualty evacuation process was
conducted in a professional manner with the additional Team Leader taking command of the
whole process.

2. Conclusions
Conclusions have been made only after extensive discussions took place between key
[Demining group] personnel involved in the planning and clearance process and after
examining the following information:
(1) [Demining group] Survey, re-survey and clearance reports.
(2) Mine detection dog assessments.
(3) Initial investigation report -physical evidence and statements.
(4) 1st Follow-up investigation report.
(5) 2nd Follow-up investigation report.
(6) Task 116 minefield map.
Location
The incident occurred in Area 2, Kumchewai minefield, within a 2 metre wide lane which had
been searched by mine detection dogs twice.
Mine Type
The only mines located in Kumchewai have been 1 x PRB-M3 and 30 x TM-46 anti-tank
mines. Although, only one PRB-M3 has been located, during the re-survey, there is a
possibility that the mine detonated by the [Demining group] Land Rover was a PRB-M3 which
had been missed by the mine detection dogs. No recognisable mine fragments or
components have yet been found inside the crater or at the incident site, which would suggest
that the mine was a non-metallic PRB-M3. However, the possibility of a TM-46 cannot be
totally ruled out.
Mine Depth
It is not possible to conclude the depth of the mine. The crater size would seem to be
consistent with controlled minefield demolitions where mines have been located at various
depths. Although, it is not possible to establish the depth, the fact that all other mines located
in the area were less than 10 cm deep, would suggest that the mine was no deeper than this.

3. Further Actions and Recommendations
1.

Recommend that the [Demining group] Global use of dogs is put under review.

2.
The task has been suspended pending the outcome of the investigation. The
Kumchewai administration and local people have been informed about the mine incident and
asked not to enter the minefield.
3.
No vehicles will be allowed to drive into Task 116 before additional verification and
clearance has been conducted in order to confirm that there is no further threat from AT
mines.
4.
The access routes will be verified / cleared using one or more of the following
methods : Manual probing, manual excavation, mechanical excavation, mechanical rollers,
'chubby' system, detectors capable of detecting PRB-M3 mines at a greater depth.
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5.
The immediate area of the incident should be investigated in order to verify the
presence of additional mines in [Demining group] cleared areas. A probing or manual
excavation process will be adopted to determine the mine type and depth.
6.
The large loop detector will be deployed to continue investigation and locate metallic
AT mines in order to identify additional mined areas before deploying manual or mechanical
assets for clearance.
7.
A review of [Demining group] clearance procedures for areas where the presence of
minimum metal mines is suspected / confirmed.
8.
Anti-tank rollers are expected to arrive in Eritrea by February 2002. They will be
deployed to Task 116 in order to conduct verification in cleared and uncleared areas.
9.
Review the procedures for driving into areas cleared of AT mines and the siting of
control points / administration areas. There is a requirement to determine at what depth of
clearance is it declared safe to drive vehicles into the cleared area.
10.
Threat depth - Before any clearance can begin, the mine threat depth must be
established in order to determine the clearance method to be adopted. It may not be possible
to get this information during the Level 1 survey, therefore, a Technical survey must be
conducted prior to commencing full clearance. Prior to commencing any mine clearance,
detectors must be tested in order to establish whether the detectors are capable of locating
mines at the required depth.
11.
Communications - Although, there are adequate Codan vehicle mounted radios and
all operational/administration Land Rovers and some trucks are fitted with Codan radios, it
would certainly be more beneficial to have additional Codan radios fitted into the remaining
trucks in the programme. The 2003 budget for the [Demining group] program in Eritrea
includes Codan radios for all trucks.
12.
Where teams are working 5 hours + from Base Locations, every effort should be
made to supply two support vehicles fitted with Codan radios.
13.
Minefield administration - Ensure that adequate on-ground time is given for
handovers between Team Leaders/ different clearance assets. A tighter control is needed by
senior operations staff to ensure that task documents such as maps and visitors/comments
books are updated, accurate and handed over when Team Leaders change.
14.
Supervision - Increased on-site supervision particularly when working in difficult
minefields (ie, minimum metal mines, AP/AT mines, minimal/no mine information) and when
deploying mixed assets (ie, manual and mine detection dogs). If we have got to have
expatriate supervisors in areas where dogs are working, it raises the question as to whether
dogs are a viable tool.
15.
Further medical training with the emphasis on major trauma, casualty handling recovery from vehicle.
16.
site.

Ensure that there area a minimum of 2 x major trauma bags at each mine clearance

Date: 07 December 2002

2.

Demining Incident Preliminary Investigation Report

For submission to the Director of the [Demining group] and the Eritrean Demining Authority
PART 1 - Initial Investigation
Part 1 Initial Investigation: 24 November 2002
Part 2 Follow-up Investigation: 26 November 2002
Part 3 Follow-up Investigation: 03 December 2002
Annexes:
1. Sketch map of Task 116
2. Sketch of mine incident site
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3. Sketch of seating plan Land Rover 110 ambulance
4. Photographs

Introduction
In accordance with [Demining group] Standard Operating Procedures, an initial investigation
was conducted into a demining incident involving a [Demining group] 110 Land Rover
ambulance on 23 November 2002 in Kumchewai, northern Eritrea.
The incident occurred prior to the commencement of [Demining group] mine clearance
operations and resulted in the death of four [Demining group] personnel and injuries to a
further two [Demining group] personnel.
Location of Incident:
The [Demining group] Minefield Area B, Task No.116, Kan1chewai, Northern Red Sea Zone,
Eritrea.
Lat: 16°28'04 N
Long: 38°38'52 E
UTM: 37462402 E
1820876 N
Date/Time of incident: 23 November 2002,
05:50
Reported By: ([Demining group] Manual Team Leader), Ins. No. ER120
Reported To: Radio Operator [Demining group] Headquarters Asmara
Person(s) Involved:
[Victim no.1] (ER720 110 Driver)
[Victim no.2] (ER120 Team Leader)
[Victim no.3] (ER408 Team Leader)
[Victim no.4] (ER 172 Deminer)
[Victim no.5] (ER 601 Deminer)
[Victim no.6] (ER 684 Deminer)
[Victim no.7] ER 423 D/Medic
[Victim no.8] ER 461 S/Commander
[Deminer/Medic] ER 413 D/Medic
[Deminer] ER 259 Deminer)
[Name excised truck driver] (ER 728 DAF Driver)
Vehicle(s) Involved: Land Rover 110 Ambulance ER 4 01355
Initial Investigation Team:
[Demining group Location Manager] Gash Barka zone
[Demining group Location Manager 2] Debub zone
[Demining group superintendent, Debub zone]
[Demining group medic/deminer]

1. Initial Investigation
Approach
The Investigation team, carrying a major trauma bag, departed from [Demining group]'s
Kamchewi camp on foot. [Name excised], the driver, remained in the camp with the
Ambulance and the second D/Medic. Contact between the camp and the Investigation team
was maintained by VHF radio and between the camp and Asmara by a Codan HP Radio.
Using a footpath in regular use by locals the team walked cross-country eventually joining the
main access track before entering the minefield. Regular GPS readings of the route were
passed via the camp to Asmara.

Before entering the minefield the general position of the 110 involved in the accident was
established by binoculars from a distance of approximately 1.5 kilometres to the East.
The team then entered the minefield from the access route and along the main breach lane
passing Administration/parking areas 1 and 2. It was evident from area 1 that the accident
had occurred in a cleared area.
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Physical evidence
Parts of tyre and other fragmentation from the vehicle were visible 100 metres to the north of
the vehicle and spread in an arc sweeping west to south.
The immediate area around the vehicle and crater was littered with vehicle
parts/fragmentation, the crater itself contained visible fragmentation from the vehicle, no mine
fragmentation was apparent. The ground on the right hand side of the vehicle was soaked in
diesel/oil. The area to the rear and left of the vehicle contained remnants of medical
equipment used to treat the casualties.
Team equipment (from both the Large Loop Detector - LLD section and additional equipment
carried on or in the vehicle at the time of the accident) had been piled up 20 metres to the
east of the vehicle and covered in plastic sheeting.
After studying the minefield maps which had been carried to, and retrieved from the scene it
was possible to identify that the detonation had taken place within an area cleared by Manual
deminers and Mine Detection Dogs (MDDs).

The following marking was located; 1.5 metre metal picket (with yellow sign attached)
indicating the position of an AT detonation that occurred in December 2001 killing a child,
perimeter turning point 101 marked during remapping in November 2002, black and white
stones indicating the location of three (2 metre x 2 metre) boxes of Manual Quality Assurance
performed on a lane of MDD clearance (QA No's 64, 65 & 66). The following measurements
were then recorded:
Depth of crater: - 0.65 metres
Diameter of crater: 2.40 metres
FROM
TO
(metres)
Turning point 101
Centre of crater
39.5
Yellow metal sign
Centre of crater
(Dec 01 Accident)

BEARING (degrees)

DISTANCE

322
44

8

21

Centre of QA box 65
Centre of QA box 66
Centre of front right
wheel
Centre of rear right
wheel (approximation)

Centre of crater
Centre of crater
Centre of crater

320
140
210

12
4.8
5.1

Centre of crater

210

7.9

This information was later used to position the crater on the available minefield maps
(indicating that the mine lay inside a dog lane); in addition mine marking tape was used to
create a two metre wide rectangle running from three outer edges of QA box 64, two edges of
box 65 and three outer edges of box 66. The majority of the crater was clearly inside the tape
(see attached photographs). [Only poor photocopies made available.]

Damage to Vehicle and Equipment
The rear right wheel of the Landrover 110 Ambulance detonated the AT mine. The vehicle
was thrown through 180° coming to rest facing back in the direction it had come. The rear
right wheel was completely destroyed, the axle had been forced upwards through an angle of
more than 45°, the floor of the rear of the vehicle had been forced through a similar angle.
The entire right hand side of the vehicle from the back door to the cab had been destroyed.
The vehicle had buckled approx. midway along the chassis causing the roof above the cab to
fold up and back. Team equipment such as detectors, tool bags, and marking rope reels that
were being carried on the roof of the vehicle were thrown clear. The trauma bag (used by the
medic at the scene) was recovered intact from the rear of the vehicle. Vests and visors
removed from the interior of the vehicle were covered in a mixture of diesel and mud, some of
the visors had broken headbands and fogged fronts. The demolition exploder case had been
partially damaged and the exploder itself had shattered. The detonator boxes carried inside
the detonator compartment built into the rear left frame of the vehicle (situated under the rear
most seat on the left) were undamaged as was the compartment itself. The explosives box
carried inside the rear of the vehicle was dented but otherwise intact. The second stretcher
(orange, vinyl) also carried inside the vehicle was badly damaged and coated in the same
diesel, mud mixture present on most of the equipment recovered from inside the vehicle.

Casualty Information
Eight people were travelling in the vehicle at the time of the accident. Three passengers died
at the scene, one died on route to hospital, two were admitted to hospitals in Keren the
remaining passengers were x -rayed at Keren Hospital and then sent to Asmara.
[Victim no.1] - Driver (Front left seat)
Suffered no obvious injuries, complained of chest pain, was x-rayed at Keren hospital, no
broken ribs was bandaged and later sent to Asmara.
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[Victim no.2] - Team Leader (Front Middle seat)
Suffered no obvious injuries, complained of chest and lower back pain, was x-rayed at Keren
hospital, no broken bones, was bandaged and later sent to Asmara.
[Victim no.3] - Team Leader (Front Right seat)
Suffered a small laceration to his right shoulder and a deformed lumber, was still alive after
accident. Died on route between Kamchewi and Afabet. Presumed cause of death blast
injury/rupture of internal organs (probably heart).
[Victim no.4] - Deminer (Rear front row left)
Suffered minor fragmentation injuries to both lower legs, broken nose, cuts, bruising and
concussion to head. Was admitted to Keren hospital. Stable.
[Victim no.5] - Deminer (Rear front row right)
Died at scene, 10 minutes after detonation. Suffered major gash to left trunk between upper
thigh and chest, Maxillofacial damage, fracture to lower arm and obstructed airway. Cause of
death blood loss/ damage to major organ.
[Victim no.6] - Deminer (Rear middle row left)
Suffered fractures to right side of pelvis and shoulder, dislocation of right femur. Small
unconfirmed fracture to top of skull. Was admitted to Keren Military hospital and later moved
to Glass Military base where there are orthopaedic facilities.
[Victim no.7] - Deminer Medic (D/Medic) (Rear middle row right)
Died at scene. Suffered severe fracture to occipital region of skull. Bone fragments visible and
brain matter discharging through nose. Fracture to left femur. Cause of death -Head injury.
[Victim no.8] - S/Commander (Rear back row right)
Died at scene. Suffered fracture to occipital region of skull with evidence of bleeding. Deep
laceration to right flank containing faecal matter. Small laceration on right buttock. Cause of
death Head Injury and/or rupture of major organ.

[Seating plan of vehicle – from an annex]
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2. Incident details:
The team prepared equipment and departed from the camp at 05:30 all ten team members
travelled in the 110 Ambulance. The DAF and driver remained in the camp with the intention
of travelling to Afabet later to collect water. The team travelled the 10 kilometres to the
minefield arriving at administration/parking area 2 at 05:50. [Deminer/Medic] and [name
excised Deminer] (Deminer) exited the vehicle and retrieved their equipment from the vehicle.
They then proceeded to the LLD area. The 110 then continued on to Administration point 3.
At some time between 05:50 and 05:55 whilst travelling south, the rear right wheel of the 110
detonated an AT mine. The vehicle was thrown forward and through an arc of 180° coming to
rest facing approximately north 5 metres from the point of impact. The driver [Victim no.1]
exited the vehicle by the drivers side door. [Victim no.2] exited through the windscreen area
(the entire window and rubber surround having been blown out).
[The deminer/medic and deminer] now at the LLD area heard but did not see the explosion.
Both ran to the area of the incident. [Victim no.4] and [Victim no.6] had both partially crawled
from the vehicle and were moved clear by Samson and [Victim no.1] they then removed
[Victim no.8], who was already dead and [Victim no.7] from the vehicle. [The Deminer/medic]
entered the rear of the vehicle to check [Victim no.5] and removed her from the vehicle, He
then retrieved the major trauma bag intact from the back of the vehicle. [The uninvolved
Deminer] then left the minefield at 06:05 and ran across country to collect the DAF from the
camp. [The Deminer/medic] began treating the casualties with [Victim no.1]’s assistance.
[Victim no.7] and shortly afterwards [Victim no.5] died of their injuries. [Victim no.6] was
placed on the undamaged stretcher. [Victim no.3] was still in the front right seat of the vehicle
(the door was jammed shut), he was conscious, talking and complaining of back pain but
insisted that others were dealt with first. 15 to 20 local people arrived in the minefield to
assist. Some of the locals forced the front right door open and removed [Victim no.3] from the
vehicle and placed him on the damaged stretcher .
The DAF arrived at the minefield at 07:00 and stopped at administration/parking point 2. The
unharmed team members and locals began ferrying the wounded and dead to the DAF.
[Victim no.3] was moved by locals first, then [Victim no.6] who was moved off the stretcher in
the back of the DAF, the stretcher was then used to move [Victim no.4], Finally the three dead
were carried to the DAF using plastic sheeting.
The DAF then moved to Kamchewi medical facility, arriving at 07:45, [Victim no.6]’s knee was
sutured, [Victim no.4] was re-bandaged and [Victim no.3] was rechecked, he was assumed to
have a broken back. Two Toyota Land cruisers driven by locals arrived to assist with
transportation of the injured. The DAF left at 08:00 carrying [Victim no.2] and the three dead
to Afabet. The two Toyotas carrying the injured and the rest of the team as well as a nurse
from the medical facility departed from Kamchewi for Afabet at 08:30. [Victim no.3] died
shortly after leaving Kamchewi. At 08:45 the DAF stopped at Kub-kub and [Victim no.2]
transferred to the second land cruiser with his Motorola radio so the two Land cruisers could
communicate (a Motorola was already being carried in the first). All vehicles then continued
on to Mabet.
At 10:15 the Land cruisers arrived at Afabet. [Victim no.4] and [Victim no.6] were again
checked and given pain relief (Nubain), [Victim no.2] and [Victim no.1] were given
paracetamol. [Victim no.3]'s body was removed from the land cruiser. [Victim no.2] then used
the hospital telephone to call the Asmara office and inform them of the accident. The DAF
arrived at Afabet at 10:45 and [Victim no.3]'s body was loaded in the back. At 11:00 the DAF
departed from Afabet carrying the four dead and [Victim no.2] and [Victim no.1]. The two Land
cruisers return to Kamchewi. An ambulance from Afabet hospital was fuelled and departed for
Keren at 11:30 carrying the wounded, [the uninvolved Deminer] and [the Deminer/medic].
At 13:35 the DAF arrived at Keren civilian hospital. [Victim no.5]'s body was moved to the
morgue, death confirmed and the body wrapped for burial. The three remaining bodies were
moved to the military hospital about 500 metres away and confirmation of death and burial
preparation was performed.
All three were placed in coffins, a fourth coffin was provided by the military for [Victim no.5]. At
14:10 the Afabet ambulance arrived at the civilian hospital. The casualties and walking
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wounded were again treated, [Victim no.4] was admitted and [Victim no.6] was later moved
and admitted to the Military hospital.

Medical assistance:
At the scene:
[Victim no.8] - No treatment died instantly.
[Victim no.7] - Head bandaged. Died 5 minutes after detonation.
[Victim no.5] - Airway cleared. Inflatable splint on arm. Trunk injury bandaged. Died 10
minutes after detonation.
[Victim no.3] - Suspected internal injuries. Died a little under 2 hours after detonation.
[Victim no.6] - First field dressing to head injury. Shoulder bandaged.
[Victim no.4] - Head and legs bandaged.
The following [Demining group] medical equipment was used both at the scene and at various
stages of the extraction to Keren.
2 x Ringers lactate (used to clean wounds)
5 x Sterile gloves (pair)
6 x Sterile gauze swab
3 x First field dressing
5 x elastic bandage
2 x Water ampules were destroyed by the detonation.

3. Chronology
21/11/02
Team redeploy to Kamchewi after 7 days stand-down.
22/11/02
Team start work at minefield. 110 Ambulance uses Control point 3
23/11/02
05:15 Team wakes and prepares equipment.
05:30 Team departs camp for minefield in 110 Ambulance.
05:50 Team arrive at admin/parking area 2, Large Loop Detector (LLD) section
([Deminer/Medic] D/Medic and [name excised Deminer] Deminer) are dropped off and
proceed to LLD area. 110 Ambulance and 8 remaining members of team continue to
admin/parking area 3.
05:50 - 55 Rear right wheel of 110 Ambulance detonates AT mine.
05:55 [Deminer/Medic] and [name excised Deminer] (upon hearing the explosion) run to the
scene. [Victim no.1] (110 Driver) and [Victim no.2] (LLD Team leader) got out of the vehicle.
05 :58 - 06:05 [The Deminer/medic] retrieves major trauma bag from the rear of the 110 and
attends to the casualties. [The uninvolved Deminer] and [Victim no.1] assist. [Victim no.2]
assembles a 420 GC thrown from the roof of the vehicle and attempts to sweep the
immediate area. [Victim no.8] (S/Commander) and [Victim no.7] (D/Medic) are both dead.
06:05 [The uninvolved Deminer] departs scene and using a safe path identified by locals and
ran across country to collect DAF truck from camp.
06:05 - 07:00 [The Deminer/medic] continues to treat casualties. [Victim no.5] (Deminer)
dies. Between 15 and 20 local people arrive to assist. [Victim no.3] (Team Leader) is moved
from vehicle by locals and laid on ground (he is conscious, talking and complaining of severe
pain).
06:30 [The uninvolved Deminer] arrives at camp and alerts DAF driver.
07 :00 DAF with driver and [the uninvolved Deminer] arrives at minefield and stops at
admin/parking area 2.
07:00-20 Casualties and bodies loaded on to back of DAF. Rest of team and several locals
also get onboard.
07:20 DAF departs minefield for Kamchewi medical facility.
07:45 DAF arrives at Kamchewi medical facility.
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07:45 - 08:30 [Victim no.6], [Victim no.4] (Deminer) and [Victim no.3] (Team leader) are
treated by Kamchewi medical staff and [the Deminer/medic]. Clean bandages applied. 2 local
Toyota Land cruisers arrive to assist with transportation.
08:00 DAF departs from Kamchewi for Afabet carrying [the uninvolved Deminer] (with
Motorola radio) and 3 bodies.
08:30 2 Toyotas leave Kamchewi for Afabet. First land cruiser driven by unnamed local
carries [Victim no.2] (with Motorola radio), an unnamed local nurse and [Victim no.3]. Second
vehicle again driven by an unnamed local carries [Victim no.1], [Victim no.4], [Victim no.6],
[the Deminer/medic] and an unnamed local.
08:30 - 45 [Victim no.3] dies shortly after leaving Kamchewi.
08:45 DAF stops at Kubko and [the uninvolved Deminer] transfers to second land cruiser with
Motorola radio.
08:46 All vehicles continue on to Afabet.
10:15 Land Cruisers arrive at Afabet.
10:15 -11:00 Casualties in Land cruisers are treated by hospital staff and re-bandaged.
10:20 [Victim no.2] uses hospital telephone to call [Demining group] Asmara office and
informs radio operator of the accident.
10:35 Asmara radio operator calls expat house and informs expats of accident.
10:45 DAF arrives Afabet.
10:45 -11:00 [Victim no.3]'s body is moved to the DAF.
10:50 Work halted at all tasks.
11 :00 DAF carrying four bodies, [Victim no.1] and [Victim no.2] leaves for Keren.
11 :20 [Name excised] (Debub Demining supervisor) departs Tserona for Asmara
11 :30 Ambulance from Afabet Hospital leaves carrying injured, [the Deminer/medic] and [the
uninvolved Deminer]. Delay caused by Ambulance being fuelled. Two local vehicles used
from Kamchewai return to Kamchewai. [Name excised] (Team leader) instructed by Asmara
to take medic and RV with Afabet ambulance.
12:40 The [Demining group] Programme Manager informs SOT [name excised] at the
UNMEE Headquarters in Asmara, of the incident, giving the location, grid reference (UTM,
Latitude and longitude), deaths and casualties. The message was subsequently passed to the
UNMEE Duty Officer.
13:00 [Name excised] (UNMACC) calls the [Demining group] Programme Manager.
Confirmation of incident details.
13:05 Investigation group consisting of [Name excised], [two names excised] and
driver/translator depart Asmara for Keren in two belly armoured 110's.
13:35 DAF arrives at Keren civilian hospital. [Victim no.5]'s body moved to morgue. Cause of
death confirmed. DAF then moves to Military hospital Keren with [Victim no.3], [Victim no.7]
and [Victim no.8]'s corpses. Cause of death confirmed by doctor. Bodies wrapped and placed
in coffins.
14:10 Afabet ambulance arrives Keren civilian hospital.
14: 10 The [Demining group] Programme Manager informs Dutch Embassy First Secretary of
incident.
14:15 [Name excised] (Team leader in Balwa) arrives Keren civilian hospital.
14:20 Investigation group passes Balwa.
15:05 Investigation group arrive Keren civilian hospital.
15 :05 [Name excised] and [name excised] check condition of casualties, talk with doctors at
both hospitals to confirm condition of casualties, cause of death of fatalities and requirements
if any. Informal interviews with [Victim no.2] and [Victim no.1] conducted.
15:43 110 Ambulance departs from Asmara to collect [Victim no.5]' body from Keren civilian
hospital.
16:00 [Name excised] updates [name excised] on situation. Confirms both casualties are
stable.
17:05 110 Ambulance from Asmara arrives Keren civilian hospital.
17:47 110 Ambulance departs Keren carrying [Victim no.5]'s body, [Victim no.2] and [Victim
no.1]. [Name excised] leaves Keren for Balwa.
18:25 [Name excised] arrives Balwa.
20:08 110 Ambulance arrives at [Demining group] compound Asmara with [Victim no.5]' s
body.
Date: 02 November 2002
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Victim Report
Victim number: 525

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: driver

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 8 hours and 20
minutes

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Chest
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The investigation reported that the Victim “Suffered no obvious injuries, complained of chest
pain, was x-rayed at Keren hospital, no broken ribs was bandaged and later sent to Asmara”.
If he was not injured, one wonders what required bandaging? No record of any field treatment
was made.
At 10:15 the Land cruisers arrived at Afabet. [Victim no.1] was given paracetamol.
At 14:10 the Afabet ambulance arrived at the civilian hospital.

Victim Report
Victim number: 526

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 8 hours and 20
minutes

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Back
minor Chest
COMMENT
See medical report.
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Medical report
The investigation reported that the Victim “Suffered no obvious injuries, complained of chest
and lower back pain, was x-rayed at Keren hospital, no broken bones, was bandaged and
later sent to Asmara”. If he was not injured, one wonders what required bandaging? No
record of any field treatment was made.
At 10:15 the Land cruisers arrived at Afabet. [Victim no.2] was given paracetamol.
At 14:10 the Afabet ambulance arrived at the civilian hospital.

Victim Report
Victim number: 527

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 7 hours and 45
minutes

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Back
minor Shoulder
severe Body
FATAL
COMMENT
Victim died more than 2 and a half hours after the accident. See medical report.

Medical report
The investigation reported that the Victim “Suffered a small laceration to his right shoulder
and a deformed lumber, was still alive after accident. Died on route between Kamchewi and
Afabet. Presumed cause of death blast injury/rupture of internal organs (probably heart)”.
[Victim no.3] – “Suspected internal injuries. Died a little under 2 hours after detonation.” [See
below.]
At 07:45, [Victim no.3] “was rechecked, he was assumed to have a broken back.”
The improvised ambulances left Kamchewi for Afabet at 08:30 and [Victim no.3] died shortly
after leaving Kamchewi – two and three quarter hours after the accident.
At 13:35 the transport arrived at a hospital and the victim's body was moved to the morgue.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 528

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 8 hours and 20
minutes

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Legs
severe Face
severe Head
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The investigation reported that the Victim “Suffered minor fragmentation injuries to both lower
legs, broken nose, cuts, bruising and concussion to head. Was admitted to Keren hospital.
Stable. “
[Victim no.4] - Head and legs bandaged at scene.
At 07:45, [Victim no.4] was re-bandaged.
At 10:15 the Land cruisers arrived at Afabet. [Victim no.4] was given pain relief (Nubain)
At 14:10 the Afabet ambulance arrived at the civilian hospital. [Victim no.4] was admitted.

Victim Report
Victim number: 529

Name: Name removed
Gender: Female

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 7 hours and 45
minutes

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Arm
severe Body
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severe Chest
severe Face
severe Leg
FATAL
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The investigation reported that the Victim “Died at scene, 10 minutes after detonation.
Suffered major gash to left trunk between upper thigh and chest, Maxillofacial damage,
fracture to lower arm and obstructed airway. Cause of death blood loss/ damage to major
organ. “
[Victim no.5] - Airway cleared. Inflatable splint on arm. Trunk injury bandaged. Died 10
minutes after detonation.
At 13:35 the transport arrived at a hospital and [Victim no.5]'s body was moved to the
morgue.

Victim Report
Victim number: 530

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 8 hours and 20
minutes

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Body
severe Head
severe Leg
severe Shoulder
COMMENT
See medical report.
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Medical report
The investigation reported that the Victim “Suffered fractures to right side of pelvis and
shoulder, dislocation of right femur. Small unconfirmed fracture to top of skull. Was admitted
to Keren Military hospital and later moved to Glass Military base where there are orthopaedic
facilities”.
[Victim no.6] - First field dressing to head injury. Shoulder bandaged.
At 07:45, [Victim no.6]’s knee was sutured,
At 10:15 the Land cruisers arrived at Afabet. [Victim no.6] given pain relief (Nubain).
At 14:10 the Afabet ambulance arrived at the civilian hospital. [Victim no.6] was later moved
and admitted to the Military hospital.

Victim Report
Victim number: 531

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: medic

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 7 hours and 45
minutes

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Head
severe Leg
FATAL
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The investigation reported that the Victim “Died at scene. Suffered severe fracture to occipital
region of skull. Bone fragments visible and brain matter discharging through nose. Fracture to
left femur. Cause of death - Head injury”.
[Victim no.7] - Head bandaged. Died 5 minutes after detonation.
At 13:35 the Victim’s body arrived at a hospital and was moved to the morgue.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 532

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 7 hours and 45
minutes

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Body
severe Head
severe Leg
FATAL
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The investigation reported that the Victim “Died at scene. Suffered fracture to occipital region
of skull with evidence of bleeding. Deep laceration to right flank containing faecal matter.
Small laceration on right buttock. Cause of death Head Injury and/or rupture of major organ”.
[Victim no.8] - No treatment died instantly.
At 13:35 the Victim’s body arrived at hospital and was moved to the morgue,

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management control inadequacy" because
of the findings of the MACC report on the investigation (see Related papers under the Other
documents tab). Significant failings in procedure and inadequacies in command lines and
training had been identified prior to the accident and were not corrected (apparently they were
not accepted as "failings"). The demining group were not working to the IMAS in several
significant ways, and their failure to provide adequate medevac, communications and fieldcontrol mechanisms were highlighted.
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” because the demining group’s own
dog specialist investigation (see Related papers) identified that the dog training had not
necessarily included training to find both of the mines known to be present in the area. It is
also possible that the site supervisors and more senior expats (who conducted the
investigation) did not react appropriately when the limitations of the dog assets became
apparent. See Annex 6 to part 3 (in Related papers) where it is stated that:“Phase 3: Manual deminers cleared a minimum of 10 metres to the sides of the mines located
by the MDDs in order to confirm the presence of additional mines. Three TM-46 mines were
located by manual deminers at a depth of less than 10 cm.”
The dogs had been run over these areas and not indicated the presence of these mines –
perhaps showing that their ability to discriminate and pinpoint signals was suspect. The
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finding of mines within this area should have raised doubts over the thoroughness of the
clearance undertaken, especially as the accident occurred close to a previous accident site so
in a place where mines may have been close together.
The demining group failed to provide appropriate medical facilities for use in the event of an
accident. The use of the ambulance as a main transport vehicle for personnel, explosives and
detonators, general equipment and medical kit is not unusual for this demining group, but
does not reach the standard required in IMAS. It has been criticised in other theatres. Prior to
the accident, ten people had been packed into the ambulance – which had a maximum
seating capacity for nine. It seems likely that, as has occurred with this demining group in
other theatres, the vehicle may not have been fully converted to serve as a long-distance
ambulance. As it was, it took an hour and ten minutes for the uninvolved deminer to run back
to camp and return with a DAF truck to serve as “ambulance”. Poor communications and poor
equipment may have led to the death of Victim no.3 who was conscious and coherent at the
accident scene but may have had a broken back. Transporting a casualty with a broken back
over rough ground in a flat-bed truck in a journey that took more than 8 hours may have been
the real cause of his death. The group’s failure to provide dedicated medics (rather than
medics who also serve as deminers and so may themselves be accident victims) is also
worthy of note.
The conduct of the pre-clearance Technical survey (described in Related papers, Annex 7 to
Part 3), where an ex-pat went into the area swinging a detector without using approved
markings, etc – and then found and destroyed surface mines – is also not unusual but does
raise questions about the application of appropriate “Technical survey” standards.
Victim no.5’s body required the military to provide a coffin and was later returned to the
demining camp – unlike the corpses of the other victims. This may have been because the
victim was a woman.

Related papers
Other documents are reproduced after the MACC's investigation into the "internal" accident
investigation.

The MACC's analysis of events
Dated 13th December 2002

The following are the MAC’s comments on this accident, edited for anonymity. The MAC did
not have the authority to carry out a full Board of Inquiry. The term “name excised” is used to
replace the name of the demining group’s MDD Programme Officer throughout what follows.

Introduction
1.
The Chief of Operations (COOPS) of the UNMEE MACC has reviewed the [Demining
group] incident report of 13 Dec 2002 and the following comments have been produced.
2.
The report describes itself as a preliminary investigation report however the report is
based on Board Of Enquiry report handled by an internal [Demining group] team and not by
an external board. The length of time between the incident and the publishing of the PlO
results, as well as the disturbance of the accident site, reduces the value of any external
enquiry at this late stage. The composition of the plo team and interested parties of [Demining
group] ensures that this report cannot be considered to be an external and unbiased report
but rather something less.

Analysis of Report

20

3.
A first comment has to be on information presented regarding the relocation of the
administration area in the executive summary at paragraph 2. The COOPS of MACC was told
on the day of the accident by the PM [Demining group] that the team administration site was
moved from its previous location in a safe area to the demined area without permission from
supervisors. This point is not dealt with fully in the report. As is the fact that this move was
undiscovered for 2 weeks until the accident meaning there was no external visit for at least
this 2-week period. The Site map provided as Annex 1 to Part 3 is presumably a reproduction
of the map held on site by the Team Leader. This map indicates the presence of at least two
Control Points for the task sites. The Area 2 Control Point is clearly indicated. Nowhere in the
report is one able to discern the location of 'Control Point 3' mentioned in Part 1, paragraph 3,
'Chronology'.

4.
Photograph 3 at Annex 4 to Part 1 clearly shows the ambulance involved in the
accident came to rest beside a small blue tarped structure. The small blue tarped structure
shown in the photograph depicts a typical [Demining group] practice of constructing medical
points inside minefields. This is where [Demining group] personnel normally place their sealed
trauma packs and is a directed practice in the [Demining group] SOPs. Typical [Demining
group] practice is the deminer who is also the Section medic is normally assigned a working
lane close to these shelters. During work breaks, the deminers close to such areas choose
whether to use these medical points as rest areas though more often than not the Team and
Section Leaders prefer the deminers remain in their clearance lanes so that time is not lost
when personnel withdraw to rest areas. [Demining group] management places continuous
and focused attention on production rates achieved by Team Leaders. Additional photographs
in this report clearly show the ambulance was driving in a minefield. This is also typical
[Demining group] minefield routine. The established administration areas are normally
manned and used only when scheduled guests visit the minefields. Day to day, [Demining
group] personnel adopt one or more of the medical points inside the minefields as pseudo
control points. Deminers bring all their equipment including equipment transport cases into
the minefields and in some cases into their clearance lanes. External MACC QA inspectors
have continually reported on these specific weaknesses in [Demining group] SOPs and
practice in the past. [Demining group] managers in Asmara have been forwarded pictures of
their personnel engaged in this practice. This is not new information for [Demining group]
Management Staff. Examples of this same behavior can be found in any [Demining group]
minefield in Eritrea.

5.
The 4th paragraph of the executive summary states that dogs do miss mines. This is
a generalized statement, which is true for any demining tool, be it manual, mechanical or
MDD demining should the tool not be deployed, managed and supervised correctly. This
typically shotgun statement is simply not true when one takes into account the excellent work
being done by demining dogs globally as well as within Eritrea. [Demining group] also fails to
fully acknowledge that the MACC, acting as the accreditation agency for EMAP, commented
on the [Demining group] dog accreditation sheets (originals available for inspection) that the
dogs had problems identifying AT mines but no problem with AP mines. It must also be noted
the [Demining group] MDD Programme Officer [name excised] had in writing and verbally
rejected the accreditation process that had brought these problems to light. This raises the
question as to whether after the MACC were relieved of the responsibility for QA in Eritrea;
unsafe MDD practices were allowed to develop especially with the MDD dog handlers being
unsupervised in country. It also brings in to question especially in light of the comments by
[name excised] in his report attached to the reviewed report whether he took any comments
by the accreditation team seriously as he does not do so in his report. It is furthermore not
surprising the dogs would miss mines when they had not trained on PRB-M3 mines for a
year.

6.
The 5th paragraph of the executive summary touches briefly on the issue of
supervision. It has been the MACC's contention since the programs inception that [Demining
group] demining activities are poorly supervised and SOPs in general are poorly written and
applied and generally not to be found on a demining task site. It is of interest to note the PlO

21

does not cover whether the SOP was on site and secondly there is no scanned copy of the
site visitor's log to determine frequency of visits to the site. The report contains no witness
statements and does not examine relevant portions of [Demining group] SOPs vis-a'-vis
comprehension by national staff and applicability of written word (that might exist in a SOP)
into minefields with a view to correcting practice by ensuring suitable instruction and guidance
exist within the document. The [Demining group] SOPs remain a document whose audience
seems to be the donor community and not the deminers. There is also no comment in this
document that 2 dog handlers were allowed to remain unsupervised while demining for
extended periods of time. It is common knowledge amongst the more experienced MDD dog
fraternity that MDD handlers require a supervisory presence regularly on site.

7.
The report fails to address the issue of [Demining group] rejection of IMAS and the
rejection of external QA that undoubtedly contributed to this accident.

8.
Under "Conclusions" on page 3 no mention is made of the site log, which could yield
important information on whether adequate supervision was in place. It may be that these
documents were lost during the events of August of 2002 and their absence was unknown to
[Demining group] higher HQ.

9.
"Location" on page 3 acknowledges a [Demining group] ambulance was driving inside
a minefield, down a 2m wide lane with mined area to each side of it as is the normal
[Demining group] practice explained above. Further, it is also normal [Demining group]
practice to use the ambulance as a transportation and administration vehicle for a demining
task site. [Demining group] deminers have in the past been routinely observed at work in a
minefield with no ambulance on site. MACC QA inspectors were, m the past, criticized by
[Demining group] management for suggesting to the Site Team Leaders they should not work
without an ambulance on site. A single ambulance has been observed as being the only
vehicle available to a single Team Leader operating even split tasking several kilometers
apart. The HF communications on any [Demining group] site can only be found mounted in
the ambulances, complicating a call for help when the ambulance is driven into a minefield
and destroyed.

10.
The conclusions are individually sound, however the issues of moving administration
areas, doctrine and SOP are not raised in any meaningful way. One must conclude the hard
questions of why the accident occurred, who is responsible for what aspects of each
contributing factor and what can be done to prevent this on other sites and in the future have
not been asked.

11.

The value of this document as part of a corrective and preventative process is nil.

12.

The initial investigation report part 1 is of interest for the following points:

a.
The time of the accident until departure for a medical facility is one hour, this is not
acceptable.
b.
What specific treatment was given to the injured parties, morphine? Drips? This is
unknown. The report makes no attempt to review adequacy of medical cover available,
medical assistance provided or shortcomings in either capacity.
c.
It appears that the medical evacuation process had not thought through the possibility
of a vehicle mine accident and planned it into operations. Clearly the [Demining group]
programme does not provide the training, equipment or contingency planning necessary to
deal with a multiple victim accident in the remote locations [Demining group] routinely sends
its demining teams.
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d.
Why was there no backup communications system? [Demining group]
communications systems and procedures have been routinely observed on in the past by
MACC QA Inspectors and found lacking. It is conceivable that an UNMEE helicopter could
have had a doctor on the ground within 60 minutes and the victims evacuated to a hospital
offering the appropriate level of care within 100 minutes.
e.
[Demining group] headquarters only received the accident report 4 hours 35 minutes
after the accident. This point is not really explored and could have contributed to the death of
the team leader. According to the report, the Team Leader was conscious and alert for 2 and
one half hours after the accident suggesting he either bled to death internally or died of shock,
either of which conditions could have been treated at a higher-level medical facility.
f.
The minefield maps in this report show at least 31 AT mines lifted in the area and
therefore it is reasonable to assume the level of internal QA should have been very high and
driving through the area should have been forbidden until all QA requirements were met.
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Parts 2 and 3 of the report have only one item of interest. The mines were all easily
detectable by metal detectors at the suspected depth of the mines. This has nothing to do
with the accident and is useful as filler for the report.
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Annexes 5 to part 3 of the [Demining group] report by [name excised] has numerous
areas of interest and distortions of the truth as follows:

a.
There was no discussion of the accreditation agency of the dogs i.e. the MACC who
had relevant information, although the MACC willingly supplied all relevant accreditation
information on file.
b.
Pam 4.4. This information however did not include the training records of April 2002
as [Demining group]'s [name excised] had neglected to return these records to the MACC and
not kept a copy. This is of concern as the MACC has records, both original and digital copies,
of all other demining agencies that have used the facility for dog training.
c.
Para 4.6 the comments regarding Ashagolgol being inaccurate and not being sure
whether the dogs were exposed to this mine are a deliberate untruth. On file in the
handwriting of the dog handler or [name excised] are the records of the training. Furthermore,
these records were forwarded to [Demining group]. [Demining group] is also welcome to
conduct a site visit to excavate these mines and determine their location in the test minefield if
in doubt of these facts.
d.
The management of [name excised] has to be clearly criticized as the MF records
clearly show TM57, 46 and PRB-M3 in the minefields. There is no excuse for not training
thoroughly on these mines. Poor discipline, management and supervision can be the only
reason that these MDD failed to be trained adequately on these mines
e.
There is no mention of the types and regularity of training of these dogs on an
ongoing basis and what facilities they had at the MF that were being used for daily and
weekly training.

15.

Annex 7 has some really disturbing information.

a.
A total of 3l AT mines of various types have been lifted in this minefield with no
heightened QA process when using dogs.
b.
The dismissal of original team leader by Eritrean government actions resulted in the
loss of the critical site records.
c.
The fact the MF map was not updated in 3 months indicates the level of management
and supervision on site was substandard.
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Conclusions
16.
The cause of the accident at Kumchewai are clear when the accident reports are
thoroughly read although these are not clearly presented in the report. The reasons for this
lack of clarity may be the fact the report is written by the responsible parties and is not an
independent report.

17.
The primary cause of this accident is clearly the lack of attention paid by [name
excised] the [Demining group] MDD Programme Officer in what the handlers were doing. The
MF records included in this PIR clearly state there were PRB-M3 mines in this MF but no
recorded training apart from the training done in the MACC training MF a year previously was
ever done on PRB-M3 mines. For some reason [name excised] wishes to say this never
happened either, further demonstrating his negligence.

18.
Coupled with the problems associated with the [Demining group] MDD Programme is
routine [Demining group] management, command and control shortcomings. These latter
problems have been formally addressed many times to the [Demining group] Management
element in Asmara. Obviously no effort has been made to correct these problems because
normal [Demining group] daily minefield routines have now led to the death of four people.

19.
The fact the [Demining group] programme was severely disrupted and critical
information was lost undoubtedly could have contributed to the accident. It is generally
accepted that a QA process is a series of layers of processes and actions to produce a level
of quality. The fact documentation was lost then not replaced or updated demonstrates this
was surely a contributing factor.

20.
Through hundreds of QA inspections conducted by UMMEE MACC prior to August
2002 it has been clearly demonstrated that the [Demining group] has areas where internal QA
adherence to SOP, appropriate SOPs and sufficient experienced site management (national
and international staff) are lacking. A clearly demonstrated corporate disdain for any external
QA and for IMAS has probably filtered to the lowest levels of the organization. The conclusion
can be made that any systems [Demining group] may list as being in place to identify
problems (alleged moving admin areas, identifying mine types in MF and ensuring tools are
trained on them) and then follow through with corrective actions are definitely not being
implemented. [Demining group] internal QA methods are clearly inadequate.

21.
It is disturbing that the author of the report alludes to culpability of [Demining group]
national staff by briefly mentioned alleged actions (movement of a CP) though does not
recognize or address the shortcomings or negligence of the International management staff.
The [Demining group] practice of establishing and using medical points inside minefields as
pseudo control points is management condoned. The danger of this practice has been
observed upon many times by external MACC QA in many [Demining group] minefields. One
can therefore only conclude International staff either do not have the training and experience
necessary to recognize the danger of this practice, or are complicit in facilitating the death of
four deminers because they did nothing to correct a known dangerous practice.

Recommendations
22.
The management and control of demining operations in Eritrea must be thoroughly
reviewed by [Demining group] and its donors in a calm objective manner to ensure negligence
on this level is not repeated.
Signed: Chief Operations Officer, UNMEE MACC
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Letter to: General [Name excised], Chairman, Eritrean Demining Authority
13 December 2002

Preliminary investigation report - Demining incident 23 November 2002
Please find enclosed a copy of the [Demining group] preliminary investigation report into the
demining incident at Kamchewai on 23 November 2002. A [Demining group] Land Rover
detonated an Anti Tank (AT) mine whilst [Demining group] personnel were driving to their
administration area on the work site. Regrettably the incident resulted in the death of four
[Demining group] personnel and the injury of two others.
Our preliminary report concludes that the Land Rover detonated an AT mine missed by mine
detection dogs (MDD) during clearance on the site.
The [Demining group] will of course fully cooperate with any further board of enquiry into the
incident that is set up by The Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA). If any further clarification is
required concerning the detail of the preliminary report The [Demining group] will of course
provide it.
A copy of this preliminary report has also been sent to the addressees on the distribution list
below.

Signed: Programme Manager The [Demining group]
Distribution: Chairman Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA)
The Royal Netherlands Embassy
The Swiss Consulate
UNMEE MACC
UNDP CTA to EDA
The [Demining group] -Headquarters United Kingdom

Demining Incident Preliminary Investigation Report for Submission to the Director of
the [Demining group] and the Eritrean Demining Authority

PART 2 - Follow-up Investigation Report
Part 2 Follow-up Investigation: 26 November 2002
Introduction
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After examining the findings from the Initial Investigation carried out on 23 November 2002, a
follow-up investigation at the mine incident site in Kumchewai was arranged between the
[Demining group] and the Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA).
Aim
For the [Demining group] Programme Manager and Operations Manager to visit the
incident site and evaluate the findings from the Initial Investigation.
To allow representative(s) from the Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA) to visit the incident
site and carry out an independent analysis of the demining incident.
To conduct a ground brief at the incident site relating to the clearance plan, clearance
methods and incident details.
Location: The [Demining group] Minefield, Task No.116, Kamchewai, Northern Red Sea
Zone, Eritrea,
Lat: 16°28'04 N Long: 38°38'52 E UTM: 37462402 E 1820876N
Follow-up Investigation Team:
([Demining group] Programme Manager
([Demining group] Operations Manager
([Demining group] Desk Officer
[Demining group Location Manager] ([Demining group] Location Mgr Gash Barka
([Demining group] Location Manager Debub )
UNDP Technical Advisor to the Eritrean Demining Authority -EDA
Eritrean Demining Authority

1. Chronology
26/11/02
07:30 Investigation team departed Asmara
12:00 Investigation team arrived at the [Demining group] remote demining camp in
Kumchewai
12:15 Briefing conducted by the [Demining group] Operations Manager (Doug Ware) Minefield history, map brief, task planning, clearance process.
12:40 Briefing by [Demining group] Location Manager ([Demining group Location Manager]) Demining Incident Initial Investigation
13:00 Vehicles parked 1 Km south from Task 116. Investigation Team walked to incident site.
13:30 At incident site - Briefing by (PM), [Demining group staff]] and [Demining group
Location Manager] (orientation from minefield map, clearance process, mine incident details,
minefield markings and initial investigation findings).
13:50 Visual inspection and photographs taken of incident site by investigation team markings, mine crater, vehicle, equipment and immediate area.
14:30 Investigation team walk from incident site to vehicles and return to [Demining group]
remote camp.
15:00 Investigation team departed Kumchewai

2. Further Actions
[Demining group] mine clearance operations at Kumchewai, Task 116 suspended,
pending outcome from Preliminary Investigation.
Kumchewai administration informed of situation and asked not to enter the area of Task
116.
Recover from the incident site serviceable tyres from the Land Rover, Codan Radio and
other serviceable equipment.
Compile a Suspension Report for Task 116.
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No driving vehicles into areas cleared of anti-tank mines until further notice.
Conduct a further follow-up investigation on 03 December 2002 with the [Demining group]
worldwide mine detection dog specialist [name excised].
Date: 04 December 2002

Demining Incident Preliminary Investigation Report for Submission to the [Demining
group] and the Eritrean Demining Authority

PART 3 - Follow-Up Investigation Report
Part 3 Follow-up Investigation: 03 December 2002
Annexes:
1. Task 116 Minefield Map – Areas 1, 2 & 3
2. Level 1 Survey Report (22/11/01)
3. Level 1 Survey Report (25/03/02)
4. Task Order - Task 116
5. Mine Detection Dog report - compiled by the [Demining group] Mine Detection Dog
Programme Officer [name excised].
6. Report - Clearance plan and conduct of clearance.
7. Background Information to [Demining group] mine clearance operations at Task No.116.
Introduction
A further Follow-up Investigation at Kumchewai was arranged following the arrival of the
[Demining group] Mine Detection Dog Programme Officer [name excised], to Eritrea. At the
[Demining group] headquarters in Asmara, [name excised] was briefed by the [Demining
group] Programme Manager and Operations Manager regarding the mine incident.
Aim
For the [Demining group] Mine Detection Dog Programme Officer to visit the incident site
and evaluate the findings from the Initial Investigation and the Follow.
To conduct a ground brief at the incident site relating to the clearance plan, clearance
methods and incident details.
Conduct Detector test using the Ebinger GC , Ebinger GCU and MINELAB F3 as part of a
continual Internal Assessment.
Location: The [Demining group] Minefield, Task No.116, Kamchewai, Northern Red Sea
Zone, Eritrea.
Lat: 16°28'04 N Long: 38°38'52 E UTM: 37462402 E 1820876N
Follow-up Investigation Team:
[Demining group] Operations Manager
[Demining group] Location Manager Debub
The [Demining group] Mine Detection Dog Programme Officer
UNDP Technical Advisor to the Eritrean Demining Authority - EDA

1. Chronology
03/12/02
07:00 Investigation team departed Asmara.
12:00 Investigation team arrived at Task No.116 Kumchewai.
12:15 Equipment unloaded and checked outside minefield.
12:20 Investigation team walked to incident site. Briefing conducted en-route.
12:40 At incident site - Briefing by [name excised] (Ops Mgr) (Site history, orientation from
minefield map, clearance process, mine incident details, minefield markings and initial
investigation findings).

27

13:00 Visual inspection and photographs taken of incident site by [name excised] - markings,
mine crater, vehicle, equipment and immediate area.
13:15 Detector tests using buried M3 fuze at various depths.
14:30 Inspection team walked from incident site to vehicle.
15:00 Inspection team departed Kumchewai.
2. Further Actions
[Name excised] to compile report based on Initial Investigation, Follow-up Investigations, Mine
Detection Dog (MDD) Accreditation report, Internal MDD training and testing, MDD clearance
process at Task No.116, clearance report.
3. Detector Test Results
The [Demining group] are currently trialing two detectors in Eritrea, the Ebinger GCU and the
MINELAB F3 detector. The main aim of these trials is to assess the suitability of the detectors
for [Demining group] mine clearance operations. As part of the assessment process the two
detectors were to be trialed at Task No.116 in Kumchewai. This had not occurred due to the
mine incident on 23 November 2002, therefore, it was decided to carry out limited testing
during the Follow-up Investigation.
An M-3 fuze removed from a PRB-M3 anti-tank mine was buried at various depths in a
cleared area of the minefield. The results were as follows :
Ground Compensation
Ebinger GCU – Good
MINELAB F3 – Good
1. M-3 Fuze Buried at 15 cm
Ebinger GCU detector - No signal
MINELAB F3 - Medium/High audio signal (with earphones fitted)
2. M-3 Fuze Buried at 12 cm
Ebinger GCU detector - No signal
MINELAB F3 - Low audio signal (without earphones fitted)
MINELAB F3 - High audio signal (with earphones fitted)
3. M-3 Fuze Buried at 11 cm
Ebinger GCU detector - Low audio signal
MINELAB F3 - Low audio signal (without earphones fitted)
MINELAB F3 -High audio signal (with earphones fitted)
4. M-3 Fuze Buried at 10 cm
Ebinger GCU detector - High audio signal
MINELAB F3 - High audio signal (without earphones fitted)
MINELAB F3 - High audio signal (with earphones fitted)
Overall Results of Limited Detector Tests at Task No.116
Ebinger GCU - With the M-3 fuze buried at 10 cm there was a clear (high) audio signal. At a
depth of 11cm the audio signal was not clear (low). It is likely that the signal would be missed
at a depth greater than 10 cm by an inexperienced deminer unless there was additional
evidence (ie, ground disturbance) to indicate the presence of a mine. There were no problems
in compensating the detector to the ground.
MINELAB - With the M-3 fuze buried at 15 cm there was a medium-high audio signal when
wearing the earphones. At a depth of 12 cm there was a low audio signal without the
earphones fitted and a high audio signal when fitted. There were no problems in
compensating the detector to the ground.
The MINELAB proved capable of locating the M-3 fuze at a greater depth than the GCU
detector.
Date: 07 December 2002

Annex 5 to Part 3
28

Demining Incident Preliminary Investigation Report for Submission to the [Demining
group] and the Eritrean Demining Authority
Mine Detection Dog (MDD) Factors
[Original numbering was confused, and is left in its non-sequential state.]

1. Abstract
1.1 On 23rd November 2002, a [Demining group] landrover carrying demining staff and their
equipment drove over, and detonated an anti tank mine in what was thought to be a cleared
area of Kamchewai minefield. This led to the death of four staff.
1.2 The subsequent on-site investigation concluded that the mine had been located within a
2.0m wide survey lane previously searched by a [Other commercial demining group]/MDC
dog team subcontracted to [Demining group] Eritrea between November 2001 and August
2002.
1.3 [Demining group]'s Mine Detection Dog Programme Officer [name excised] thus arrived
in Eritrea on 1st December 2002 in order to review all evidence relating to the accident with
programme staff, the aim being;
To identify critical factors from an MDD perspective which may have been instrumental in
causing the mine to be missed.
To draw relevant conclusions in relation to [Demining group]'s use of MDDs world wide.
To consider relevant changes to MDD SOPs.

2. Programme and information reviewed
2.1 The following programme was followed;
Monday 2nd December: Discussions with programme staff including viewing of minefield
maps and collation of information.
Tuesday 3rd December: Site visit with [Demining group Location Manager 2], and UNDP rep.
Wednesday 4th December: Further discussions in the light of the site visit and completion of
data collation.
Thursday 5th December: Report writing
2.2 The following archived information relating to the activities of the dog team at Kamchewai
was reviewed;
-MDD training and accreditation records
-Daily search records
-MDD health records
-Weather data

3. Background information, tasking and clearance methodology
3.1 Information gleaned from survey work conducted at Kamchewai by [Demining group] in
November 2001 including some limited clearance of visible mines led to the conclusion that
the mined area was characterised by a pattern of low density anti tank mines. Mine types
confirmed as being present (and substantiated through anecdotal evidence provided by EDF)
included TM-46 and PRB-M3.
3.2 What was less clear from this survey work despite the location and removal of five mines
(1 x PRB-M3 and 4 x TM-46) was the extent of the mine rows in what is a very open and
featureless flat valley bottom between the former Eritrean and Ethiopian lines. As such, the
task required an initial phase of technical survey, to be followed by full manual clearance once
the mine rows had been located.
3.3 The MDD team was therefore tasked in April 2002 to conduct clearance work at the site.
The objectives of this clearance were as follows;
a. To create an initial safe access to the vicinity of the mine rows from CP 1.
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b. To conduct further technical survey in order to identify the location, types and
numbers of mines present.
3.4 Once this had been achieved, then the dog team was to be withdrawn, and full clearance
of the identified danger areas completed by manual deminers.
3.5 The MDD clearance methodology adopted was lane search, since the main requirement
was to create access, and then conduct further technical survey through imposing a grid of
2.0m wide lanes in an intersecting pattern. Lane search involves the laying out of five x 0.6m
wide by 12.0m long lanes side by side to create a 12.0m long by 3.0m wide search bound.
Each individual lane within that bound is demarcated by a 3/4" diameter x 12.0m long UPVC
pipe. A 1.0m overlap is maintained at either end of the bound, and 0.5m down either side.
This implies that once the full bound has been searched by both dogs (and no indications
made), then the central 2.0m wide x 10.0m long strip is declared as clear, effectively forming
a 2.0m wide access lane. Successive bounds are thus cleared in this way, and survey lanes
cleared into the mined area.
3.6 Once the initial access way had been cleared from CP1 into the mined area, then blocks
of ground (Areas 1 and 2) were subjected to technical survey with the dogs clearing "vertical"
2.0m wide lanes into the mined area from the cleared base-lane, and manual deminers
completing the boxing of the areas by clearing 2.0m wide "horizontals".
3.7 It is therefore [Name excised]'s conclusion that the tasking of the MDD team was quite
legitimate in terms of the methodology adopted (lane search), and given the prior evidence of
the nature of the mines and anticipated pattern and density of mine laying.
3.8 Indeed, it is to be noted that this process did in fact work successfully, with the MDD
team locating and clearing six TM-46 AT mines (4 additional TM-46 were located by support
deminers from the MDD team using Ebinger GC detectors), and more importantly, providing
the requisite information on which to base the subsequent manual clearance of the area.

4. Site visit and physical conditions
4.1 [Name excised] visited the accident site with [Demining group Location Manager 2], and
[name excised] on Tuesday 3rd December. The ground was walked, and [names excised]
provided an overview of how the clearance had been planned, how it subsequently
progressed, and the circumstances surrounding the accident itself.
4.2 In terms of the site conditions, it is characterised by a mainly flat and sandy soil with (at
the time of the clearance in May 2002) very little vegetation. As such, this provided ideal MDD
search conditions with very little pre-preparation or vegetation cutting required.
4.3 [Name excised] noted that in the area of the accident site, areas of sand erosion due to
surface water scour, and deposition around the base of vegetation which may have affected
the exposure or increased burial of mines. Indeed, the five mines lifted by [name excised] in
November 2001 were all visible, plus the first TM-46 mine located by the MDD team was
subsequently reported to have been located at 28.0cm deep. This evidence would seem to
suggest that the area is affected by both erosion and deposition.
4.4 A further consideration of the MDD searched lane itself where the mine detonated
confirmed that the mine would have been located slightly to one side of the centre line, and at
the junction with a manually-cleared "horizontal" lane. Whilst some doubts were raised as to
whether the manually cleared lane would actually have crossed through the MDD cleared
"vertical", (and thus over the mine) it is [name excised]'s opinion that since the MDD lane was
cleared first, the deminer clearing the "horizontal" at that point would simply have begun
his/her clearance at the edge of the lane. It is therefore highly unlikely that this mine was also
missed by a manual deminer .
4.5 In terms of the detonation crater itself, there is no evidence to suggest abnormal
circumstances in terms of a deeply buried or boosted mine. No metal fragments have been
located within the base or walls of the crater itself which could suggest that the mine was nonmetallic. This is however, not a definitive conclusion.
4.5 However, on the balance of evidence, it is [name excised]'s opinion that there is a
reasonable expectation that the mine was of plastic construction, and given the previous
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location of this mine type close to the point of the accident, then it is not unreasonable to
assume that it may have been a PRB-M3.

5. Review of archived data
5.1 The following available information regarding MDD training, accreditation, daily search
records, health and weather data was reviewed.
MDD training
5.2 [Demining group] MDD SOPs place a particular emphasis upon ensuring that MDD
teams are correctly trained prior to the conduct of live clearance tasks. This includes not only
the type of clearance methodology to be practised, but also education of dogs to recognise all
mine types known or anticipated to be present within the local theatre.
4.3 To this end, two weeks of training was conducted with the MDD team at the Asha Gol Gol
training site during early and mid-ApriI2002, just prior to the start of the Kamchewai task. The
main aim of this process was to train the dogs in lane search and the clearance of access and
survey lanes. This process was overseen first by [Demining group]'s MDD Trainer [name
excised], and latterly by [name excised].
4.4 At the time, it was not confirmed which site the dogs would be deploying to since further
survey was on-going, plus negotiations being conducted with EMAP in order to gain access to
suitable task sites outside of the TSZ.
4.5 Although details of the training conducted were not recorded, the emphasis was based
upon ensuring that the dog team was working effectively in lane search, i.e that the drills and
pattern of search were effective. Less emphasis was thus given to educating the dogs to mine
types other than those which they had already been exposed to during previous training and
accreditation periods (PMN, PMD-6, TM-46, TM-57).
4.6 The [Demining group] MDD training site at Adi Hilmo (Tsorena) did not at that time
include PRB-M3 mines (one added in June 2002). The box map records for Asha Gol Gol are
known to be inaccurate and incomplete, and it is unsure whether PRB-M3s are present there.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that prior to the start of MDD clearance at Kamchewai
(where a PRB-M3 presence had previously been confirmed in November 2001), the dogs had
not been adequately exposed to this mine type.
4.7 In [name excised]'s opinion, this is a most serious omission and almost certainly an
important factor in the occurrence of this accident -if the mine which detonated was indeed a
PRB-M3.
MDD Accreditation Testing
4.8 [The] MDD team underwent and passed both internal and external accreditation testing
during the contract period. In November 2001, internal testing was passed on [Demining
group]'s site at Adi Hilmo, and this was followed by an external examination conducted by
UNMEE MACC at Asha Gol Gol. This was also passed, although a weakness in relation to AT
mines was noted. This issue was subsequently resolved prior to the conduct of any live
clearance through specific training in relation to AT mines. No written documentary evidence
exists to confirm how this training was conducted, or indeed, whether a variety of AT mine
types were used. It is however [name excised]'s expectation that emphasis would have been
placed upon TM-46 and TM-57's as the most prevalent AT mine types in Eritrea (also known
to be available at Asha Gol Gol).
4.9 The last internal assessment prior to the search at Kamchewai took place in February
2002 at [Demining group]'s Adi Hilmo site. This was passed successfully, although did not
include search for AT mines.
4.10 Both external and internal MDD testing requirements had therefore been met prior to the
conduct of the task at Kamchewai.
Daily Search Records
4.11 Evidence from the marking of QA boxes (No's 65 and 66) cleared in the immediate
vicinity of the accident site has confirmed that the search over that area would have taken
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place on either 14th or 15th May 2002. [Name excised] thus re-visited the daily search
records for those days and notes the following;
Weather Data
Weather data was recorded from a Campbell Scientific Basic Weather Station which was
located at Kamchewai for the duration of the task in order to monitor the main weather
conditions. This was backed up through the use of Kestrel 3000 hand-held anemometers at
the clearance site itself.
Conditions during the periods of search on both days (05.30hrs-07.55hrs) were within
acceptable parameters. Temperatures did not exceed 30 degrees C, with low wind speeds in
the 0-3.0m per second range recorded. Air humidity remained relatively low at between 80%
and 33%. Rainfall totalled only 2.6mm during May, and fell prior to the period of the 14th/15th.
It did not have any significant effect upon the pattern of soil moisture.
Soil moisture
Soil moisture remained at a very constant and relatively low level, with variation only being
recorded between 6.7% and 6.8%. This would suggest that levels of evaporation (which are
known to assist MDD search) would have been very low.
Work load and MDD health
The total ground searched by the dog team over both days was 693m2, an average of 346m2
per dog per day in a single morning working session. This is entirely consistent with normal
rates of work, and does not suggest any over-stressing of the team given the prevailing
conditions.
The daily health check records for the period confirm that the dogs were at all times fit to
work.
Performance
The notes provided within the daily search records for both days (signed by the handler and
MDD team supervisor) suggest that the performance of the dogs on both days was good, with
high drive and concentration noted. This corroborates similar evidence from the remainder of
the task, and suggests that to all intents and purposes, the dogs were performing as they
should. This was backed up by the physical evidence of the location of 6 x TM-46 AT mines
indicated by the dogs over the duration of the task.
Speed of search over the duration of the Kamchewai task was 2.84m2 cleared per minute of
search undertaken. This is the slowest search rate recorded by this team over the duration of
the full contract period, and suggests that particular care was being taken in view of the
proven mines presence.
Clearance of indications and QA
4.12 [Name excised] assessed the conduct of clearance of indications of QA, and noted the
following. In both cases, procedures were followed correctly, with a 3.0m x 3.0m box being
cleared around each indication using 420GC detectors. A total of eighteen indications were
recorded, with 162m2 of ground being cleared during the investigation process.
In terms of QA, the 2.0m x 2.0m QA boxes were sensibly distributed throughout the lanes
cleared by the dogs, and amounted to a total of396m2 (or 9.85% of the MDD cleared area).
This conforms to the minimum [Demining group] requirement of 10%.
However, it is [name excised]'s observation that given the confirmed presence of mines at this
site, and the fact that manual deminers supporting the MDDs were able to clear a further
8,931m2 of ground, that a greater emphasis should have been given to QA, with a higher
proportion of the dog-searched ground being retrospectively cleared by manual deminers.
A further issue is that both the investigation of indications and QA was carried out using the
420GC detector. Whilst this is clearly acceptable where only a metallic mine threat exists, the
prior confirmed presence of minimum metal anti tank mines at Kamchewai, and the
knowledge ( confirmed by previous field tests) that this detector could only locate a PRB-M3
to +/- 7.0cm (to the top of the pressure plate), raises questions about the validity of this
method.
In [name excised]'s opinion, all investigation of MDD indications and QA should have been
conducted using manual excavation. This would have been a relatively easy process given
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the light and loose nature of the to 20cm of soil, and would not have significantly retarded the
progress of clearance since the areas involved were not large.
Moreover, more QA should have been conducted behind the dogs given the nature of the
threat and available resources. This "thickened" level of QA has previously been employed by
[Demining group] where dogs have worked on confirmed minefields in Somaliland.

5. Conclusions and recommendations
5.1 It is clear that the mine accident in ground which was assumed to be clear at Kamchewai
on 23rd November 2002 was the result of a number of important factors, some in direct
relation to the performance of the dog team, and some detailed elsewhere within this accident
report in relation to command and control issues.
5.2 It is clear that an AT mine - possibly a PRB-M3, was missed by a sub-contracted [Other
commercial demining group]/MDC team on the 14th or 15th May 2002 whilst conducting the
clearance of lanes as part of the technical survey process in Area 2 of the minefield. It does
not seem likely that this mine was particularly deeply buried, nor is there any other evidence
which calls into question the validity of the teams' tasking given the information available at
the time.
5.3 The dog team had been formally tested both internally and externally, and had proven its
competence in this respect on at least three occasions prior to the conduct of tasking at
Kamchewai. Six TM-46 AT mines were located by the dogs during the course of clearance
with a further four being detected by supporting manual deminers clearing ground with 420GC
detectors.
5.4 Over the period of clearance, site conditions were good, and weather within acceptable
parameters. The dogs' health was good, and performance at all times reported as being at an
operationally acceptable level.
Signed: Mine Detection Dog Programme Officer 05th December 2002

Annex 6 to Part 3
Proposed clearance plan and Conduct of Clearance in Kumchewai Minefield (IMSMA
Task No.116)
Proposed Clearance Plan (Refer to attached sketch map -Completed to Phase 5)
Phase 1: Clear a breach lane from the north in a southerly direction to the location of the AT
mines removed during the survey. Establish a base lane and safe access to the mined area
from which MDDs would be deployed in order to conduct further investigation of the area.
Phase 2: MDDs to clear 2 metre wide lanes perpendicular to the MDD breach lanes therefore,
creating a grid pattern (boxes). The aim of this process was to conduct area reduction in order
to locate further mines and establish the mine pattern.
Phase 3: Manual deminers (from the MDD team) to clear the remaining areas (inside the
boxes) in order to verify the presence of any additional mines in the area.
Phase 4: Task handed over by MDD team to a manual team.
Phase 5: Manual team conduct additional clearance around areas identified as mined by the
MDD team and conduct further area reduction in order to confirm the presence of additional
mines / pattern.
Phase 6: Area reduction and Verification using mechanical anti-tank rollers in areas outside
the cleared areas.
Phase 7: Task Completion and Handover.

Mine Detection Dog Training
On 30 November 2001, all four [Demining group]/[Other commercial demining group] dogs
passed their accreditation with buried anti-personnel and anti-tank mines at Asha Golgol
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training area. In February 2002, the dogs were tested by [Demining group] in Asha Golgol on
buried anti-personnel mines. In April 2002, prior to deploying the two remaining dogs to
Kumchewai, training was conducted in Asha Golgol with buried AP and AT mines.

Conduct of Clearance (Area 1)
Phase 1: A 4 metre wide lane was cleared from the Bench Mark / Datum Point using MDDs
and manual deminers. 50 % of the lane was cleared by manual deminers ( 1m wide both
sides of the 2 metre wide dog lane), 50% was cleared by MDDs (2 metre wide between the
manual cleared lanes) and a l0 % quality assurance of the MDD cleared area was conducted
by manual deminers. These areas were marked with black/white numbered stones on the
ground and recorded on the minefield map. One TM-46 AT mine was located by the MDDs.
Phase 2: After locating the TM-46, MDDs were deployed in this area in order to establish a
mine pattern. Four additional TM-46 mines were subsequently located by the MDDs in a
staggered line. One of the mines was reported by the MDD handler to have been located at a
depth of 28 cm, all others were located less than 10 cm deep. Quality assurance by manual
deminers was conducted in 10 % of the area cleared by MDDs.
Phase 3: Manual deminers cleared a minimum of 10 metres to the sides of the mines located
by the MDDs in order to confirm the presence of additional mines. Three TM-46 mines were
located by manual deminers at a depth of less than 10 cm.

Conduct of Clearance (Area 2)
Administration / parking area No.1 was established in a cleared area 140 metres north-east of
Area 1 where the mines had been located by the MDDs. No.2 administration / parking area
was established 250 metres south-east of the first administration area. No.3 administration /
parking area was established 300 metres south-east from the second administration / parking
(mine incident site). This was established on 11 November 2002.
Phase 1: Clearance was conducted from Area 1 to Area to Area 2 using the same clearance
process as conducted in Area I in order to extend the breach lane to the area where the
mines were located during the survey.
Phase 2: MDDs were deployed from the base lane into the area where the mines were
located during the survey. The MDDs cleared 2 metre wide investigation lanes in order to
confirm the presence of further mines and establish the mine pattern. Two metre wide lanes
were cleared by manual deminers perpendicular to these lanes in order to grid the area
(create boxes) and provide the handler with a manually cleared base lane to deploy the dogs
from. Manual deminers conducted 10% quality assurance of the MDD cleared areas. These
areas were marked with black/white numbered stones on the ground and recorded on the
minefield map. One TM-46 was located by the MDDs in this area.
Phase 3: Manual deminers cleared the areas inside the boxes in order to confirm the
presence of additional mines. No mines were located.
The MDD team finished work in Kumchewai on 22 May 2002 and on 09 June 2002, the
manual team commenced operations.
Phase 1: Manual deminers conducted clearance in Area 1 in order to confirm the presence of
additional mines in areas around the location of the MDD mine finds. No mines were located.
Phase 2: Manual deminers were deployed to Area 2 to verify the presence of additional mines
and conduct area reduction in order to reduce the size of the mined area prior to completion.
The Team leader was briefed by the Operations Manager (DW) to conduct complete
excavation to a depth of 30 cm in the area where the PRB-M3 was located during the survey.
The aim of this was to try and establish the presence of additional AT mines, in particular,
PRB-M3 minimum metal mines and if located confirm the depth of the mines. On average, a
manual deminer using a detector was clearing 80 + square metres per day in contrast to the
area being excavated where the deminer was clearing less than 5 metres per day. After a
number of TM-46 mines had been located in Area 2 at a depth of less than 10 cm using
detectors and an area of approximately 900 square metres had been excavated resulting in
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no mines being found, it was decided to stop the excavation process and continue clearance
with detectors only.
Phase 3: Further manual clearance was conducted in Area 2 which resulted in additional
mines being located and a better understanding of the mine pattern.

Conduct of Clearance Using the Large Loop Detector
In order to conduct additional investigation and consequently, speed up the clearance
process, Large Loop Detector (LLD) procedures were written and introduced. LLD procedures
for the clearance of high metallic content anti-tank mines had already been written and were
included in the [Demining group] Eritrea Manual Demining SOPs. As there was a threat from
minimum metal AT mines in Kumchewai there was a requirement to write additional
procedures. These procedures were written as an annex to the Manual Demining SOPs. Prior
to deploying the LLDs, the Operations Manager conducted training in Kumchewai with the
Debub Location Manager, the Debub Demining Supervisor, the Kumchewai manual Team
Leader and Section Commander. Subsequent training was given to the remainder of the
team. Clearance commenced on 24 October 2002.
Phase I: A 2 metre wide lane was cleared from Area I to the location of the 3 AT mine holes
to the west.
Phase 2: Clearance between the holes in order to confirm the presence of additional mines
and establish the pattern. No mines were found between the 3 holes.
Phase 3: Further clearance was conducted around the three holes. No mines were located.
Phase 4: Clearance was conducted from the third hole in a southerly direction in order to
trace the mine line. 5 mines were located in a line which had been laid in a single line in
intervals of 10-20 metres in a zig-zag pattern at a depth of less than 10 cm.
Additional Information: There had been numerous [Demining group] expatriate visits to the
site throughout the entire clearance process and the Team Leader was continually given
advice on the clearance plan and procedures. Discussions took place in Kumchewai between
the Operations Manager, the Debub Location Manager and the Kumchewai Team Leader
about the threat from PRB-M3 minimum metal mines and the depth of these mines.
Clearance plans were formulated based on evidence up to that date. Only 1 PRB-M3 had
been located during the survey which was only partially buried, four TM-46 had been located
in the vicinity only partially buried during the survey, the unconfirmed report of a TM -46
located in Area 1 at a depth of 28 cm was the only one located deeper than 10 cm and this
area is a distance of 300 metres from the mines located in Area 2. All 18 mines located in
Area 1 were metallic TM-46 mines. An area of 900 square metres was manually excavated
around the location of the PRB-M3 and it was only after additional mines had been located in
the area at depths of less than 10 cm and the previously mentioned points, that the
excavation process was stopped.
There had been discussions about deploying the armoured Terex with the AT 'Gill system' to
Kumchewai in order to carry out mechanical excavation. This did not happen for the following
reasons:
(1) The difficulty in deploying the low-Ioader and Terex to Kumchewai due to poor road
conditions/access.
(2) It was decided that the clearance process would be slow as the Terex would have to
excavate its way to Area 1 from a distance of 300 + metres.
(3) The availability of the Terex at the time.
Planning was therefore based on the number of deep buried mines located, the number of
minimum metal mines located and the depth and the fact that all AT mines located with the
exception of one, were at a depth of less than 10 cm.
As clearance continued, [Demining group] were able to obtain additional mine information
from the local people:
(1) A report of AP mines being laid on hills to the north.
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(2) A TM-46 had been seen by a local man at approximately 500 metres to the south/southwest direction from Area 2 of the minefield.
(3) Three holes had been seen approximately 200 metres to the west of Area I of the
minefield. It was reportedly by locals the holes marked the location where 3 x AT mines had
been removed by the EDF.
All these reports were investigated and resulted in a survey of the suspected AP minefield
being conducted and confirmation of the location of the 3 mine holes using the Large Loop
Detector (this led to subsequent clearance using the LLD and the location of 5 x TM-46).
In Area 1, mines had been laid at 10-20 metre intervals in a zig-zag pattern heading in a
north-west to south-east direction (classic Soviet mine laying pattern). In Area 2 mines were
laid at irregular intervals of between 5-30 metres in a zig-zag pattern heading in a north-east
to south-west direction. It is likely that the mines located in Area 1 and by the Large Loop
Detector are part of the same line. To aid the Team Leader in drawing the minefield map,
metal poles with flags were placed where mines had been located and compass bearing were
taken.

Annex 7 to Part 3
Background Information To [Demining group] Mine Clearance Operations at Task No.
116
The [Demining group] commenced mine clearance operations in Eritrea in April 2001 and up
to the end of October 2002 had located and destroyed 2263 anti-personnel mines and 210
anti-tank mines. [Demining group] currently deploys 6 manual demining teams, each team
comprising 3 sections of 7 deminers. The 6 teams are split equally between Gash Bark and
Debub locations. A technical survey team is currently deployed in the Gash Barka region
(western Eritrea), 2 EOD/Survey teams are working in Gash Barka and the Northern Red Sea
region and 6 mechanical teams are operating in Gash Barka. Up until the end of August 2002,
[Demining group] deployed 10 manual demining teams (6 in Gash Barka and 4 in Debub ). A
mine detection dog team comprising 2 pairs of dogs sub-contracted from [other commercial
demining group], 2 handlers, a supervisor, team leader and 5 manual deminers was deployed
in Eritrea from June 2001 up until the end of March 2002. After one of the dog handlers left
the program in April 2002, the team was reduced to 2 dogs and 1 handler .
Kumchewai is situated approximately 75 Km north-east of Keren and can be reached by
vehicle along a dirt/sand road. [Demining group] established a remote demining camp near
the village and the minefield is situated 6.5 Km north-west of the camp which is a drive time of
15-20 minutes along a sandy track.. Anti-tank mines were laid in 1978 by Eritrean forces in
order to prevent Ethiopian armour from moving through the area.
On 22 November 2001, a Level 1 survey was conducted in Kumchewai (IMSMA Task
No.116) by the [Demining group]. After talking with the Kumchewai Administrator, villagers
living adjacent to the minefield, information from EMAP (Eritrean Mine Action Program) and
seeing visible AT mines, the survey team concluded that the minefield contained anti-tank
mines only. According to information from the EMAP, the EDF (Eritrean Defence Force) had
conducted clearance in the area and removed several AT mines. During the survey, 1 x PRBM3 and 4 x TM-46 were clearly visible. The mines were partially buried with the pressure
plates protruding above the surface of the ground. (See photographs attached to [Demining
group] Survey Report YT/E-37-126/93). On 22 January 2002, a [Demining group] expatriate
who was working at the time as BOD/ BAC Supervisor, visited the Kumchewai minefield with
the aim of confirming the information from the survey report and recovering the visible mines
or if required, conduct in situation explosive ordnance disposal.
During the initial mine incident investigation carried out in Kumchewai on 26 November 2002,
[name excised] reported that on 22 January 2001, he had used an Ebinger H detector to
sweep into the suspected area from an area to the north-west of the visible mines. He was
wearing ballistic body armour and visor and had swept the detector to the front of him in
interlocking arcs as he walked forward. [Name excised] stated that no signals were detected
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and was convinced that his search had covered the location that the mine accident (23
November 2002) had occurred. [Name excised] removed the visible anti-tank mines (1 x
PRB-M3 and 4 x TM-46) which were subsequently, recovered to Asmara for destruction at the
CDS (central demolitions site). The location of each mine removed was marked with a metal
'danger mine' sign and 'danger mine' signs were placed to mark the perimeter of the
dangerous area.
A re-survey was conducted by the [Demining group] on 25 March 2002, confirming the
information gathered during the initial Level1 survey. (See photographs attached to [Demining
group] Survey Report AGG/E-37-126/93).
A Task Order requesting the [Demining group] to conduct a reconnaissance, a technical
survey and clearance using MDDs and clearance using manual deminers was issued by the
EMAP on 20 May 2002. This was signed and returned by the [Demining group] on 03 June
2002. (See attached Task Order 34/02 [Demining group]).
Prior to [Demining group] commencing mine clearance operations in Kumchewai the site was
visited by the Operations Manager, the MDD (Mine Detection Dog) Handler and a [Demining
group] worldwide MDD specialist. A clearance plan was formulated in the Operations Cell in
Asmara and a MDD Team was deployed and commenced operations in Kumchewai on 19
Apri12002. During the MDD clearance phase the task was visited by the former Debub
Location Manager who was accompanied by the Programme Manager. The MDD team
completed operations on 22 May 2002 and on 09 June 2002 Manual Team 1 commenced
work in Kumchewai. Prior to this a handover between, [name excised] (MDD Team Leader),
[name excised] (Dog Handler) and [name excised] (Team Leader Manual Team 1) occurred
in Kumchewai.
On 29 August 2002, [Demining group] suspended all its operations in Eritrea while
discussions took place between the Eritrean government and the [Demining group] over
employment issues. This period of time was a huge disruption to [Demining group]'s
operations in Eritrea and [Demining group] were forced to dismiss a number, of key personnel
including [name excised]. Consequently, the Kumchewai minefield map was not updated and
a number of task documents such as the visitors / comments book was lost. [Demining group]
commenced operations again on 26 September 2002 and in Kumchewai, [Victim no.3]
replaced [name excised] as Team Leader, commanding a section from Manual Team 2.
Prior to the mine incident on 23 November 2002, the [Demining group] had cleared the
following anti- tank mines in Kumchewai (IMSMA Task No.116) :
Indicated by MDD and cleared by manual -6 x TM-46 (5 in Area 1, 1 in Area 2)
Manual Deminers from the MDD team -4 x TM-46 (3 in Area 1, 1 in Area 2)
Manual Team using GC detectors -11 x TM-46 (Area 2)
Manual Deminers using Large Loop Detector -5 x TM-46 (North-east of Area 2)
Removed during survey -1 x PRB-M3, 4 x TM-46 (Area 2)
TOTAL 30 x TM-46 1 x PRB-M3
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